Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new assumption, i.e., computation linear assumption, then we provide a new identity-based signature algorithm based on this assumption, use the bilinear pairings technique. We proof the security of this scheme based on the computation linear assumption. The scheme is proposed under the standard model.
Introduction
In wireless sensor network (WSN), there are many so-called motes that used to monitor the surrounded environmental data, such as sound, temperature, pressure, and so on [1] . Data collected by these motes is transmitted through wireless network. Therefore, how to provide authentication for message and source of message is critical. In some works, identity-based signature is deemed to be a proper mechanism to support message authentication, therefore, we concentrate on constructing new secure identity-based signature scheme for WSN.
Most proposed Identity-based signatures are proven secure under large integer factorization [2] or computation Diffie-Hellman assumption [3] , [4] .In this paper, we propose a new computation assumption, which is called "Computation Linear Assumption (CLIN)". Intuitively, CLIN can be interpreted as: given generator 1 2 3 , ,    of group  with prime order p , given values CLIN can be view as a computation "version" of decisional Linear assumption (DLIN) proposed by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [5] . DLIN can be briefly described as: given identity-based signature based on the difficulty of large integer factorization [2] , after that, many IBS are proposed, such as [3] , [4] .
Preliminaries
Our CP-RABE scheme adopts the Computation Linear Assumption, we describe it as follows. Definition 1 [Computation Linear Assumption(CLIN)]: Let  be a group with prime order p ,
, ,    are three group generators. Let 1 2 3 , ,
, ,
In addition, the algorithm picks , ,u'',m''
n n , respectively. The algorithm issues:
as public key. The master secret key is 1 2 { , , } MSK y r r  . Extract. Assume I is a bit string of length I n , which represents the identity of some user. Define ( ) I i as the i th bit of I . Let the set {1, , }
The algorithm chooses two integers ,1 ,2 ,
and computes:
, .
The private key assigned to the user is ,1
Sign. Suppose I is the bit string of the user's identity, m is the very message needed to be signed.
be the set of indices j such that ( ) 1 M j  , where ( ) M j denotes the j th bit in the message bit string. Given the private key pair ,1 The signature about message m is generated as: Verify. Given a signature ,1 
Security
In this section, we will show that our scheme is secure under the Computation Linear Assumption. We employ the following theorem to prove the security. Our identity-based signature scheme is secure, if the Computation Linear Assumption holds. Proof. Assume there exists a forger  can existentially forge signatures of our scheme, then we can construct a Probabilistic Polynomial -Time challenge algorithm  to break the CLIN assumption. Firstly, the challenger  achieves the parameters of CLIN assumption: 
To facilitate our following description, we define eight functions employed to encode the identity and message.
( ) , ( ) ,
According to the above construction, B construct the public keys as follows:
Notice that,  actually implicitly sets 
Finally,  sends all these public keys to the forger  . Queries. The forger  can adaptively query for private keys or signatures as it needs. We discuss the responding answers from  to  as follows:
1) Extract Queries. For this type of query, the forger  needs to send an identity, named I , to  . Let the set {1, , } 
